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Abstract: The new economic importance of the Chinese economy has created Chinese 
expectations that the country will be able to regain a political and cultural position in the world in 
accordance with this economic status. But for China to become a respected member of world 
society, one of the most severe obstacles is its, from a western perspective, undemocratic political 
system. The article describes the lively debate going on among Chinese intellectuals of diverse 
political-ideological convictions about what kind of democracy should be the model for China’s 
future political system. The liberally oriented intellectuals want a political system very much like 
American liberal constitutional democracy, while intellectuals on the left side of the political 
spectrum want a democracy with a clear socialist basis. Although Chinese intellectuals form a 
minority in society, these intellectual debates are sure to have influence on both public opinion 
and opinions and attitudes among political decision makers inside the Chinese Communist Party. 
Further investigations will have to establish to what degree the perceptions of China’s political 
future and democratization are reflected in the political attitudes among the Chinese in general, 
and how they are perceived inside the confines of political decision making in the Chinese 
Communist Party. Only then will it be possible to answer the questions: “What kind of 




China is rising - this is an indisputable fact. Economic development in China during the last thirty 
years has resulted in a fundamental change in the Chinese economy. China’s economy has 
become the second largest in the world, and it seems inevitable that it, within the next decade, 
will become the world’s largest economy. China will then have reclaimed the position in the 
global economy it possessed around the year of 1800. The new economic importance of the 
Chinese economy has created Chinese expectations that the country will be able to regain a 
political and cultural position in the world in accordance with this economic status. But for China 
to become a respected member of world society, one of the most severe obstacles is its, seen from 
a western perspective, undemocratic political system. Since the end of the Cold War the main 
contradiction in the world - according to the dominating western worldview - has changed from a 
contradiction between capitalist democracy and communist dictatorship into a more generalized 
contradiction between democracy and authoritarianism. Development from 
totalitarian/authoritarian government towards democratic government is seen as a universal law 
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of history, making society increasingly free. Steps in this global development include the 
profound political changes in the southern part of Europe from fascist military dictatorships in 
Spain, Portugal and Greece and communist one-party dictatorships in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe towards democratic societies. Recently the so-called “Jasmine Revolution” or “Arab 
Spring” has given further credibility to this concept as dictatorial regimes have been toppled in a 
number of North African states. This transformation from dictatorship to democracy paves the 
way for these countries to become respected members of a world system, dominated by the USA. 
 Bruce Gilley in his predictions on “China’s Democratic Future” (Gilley, 2004) states that 
the main reason for the West to wish for a democratization of China is the fact that this would 
diminish the danger of conflicts between China and the Western world; it is theoretically 
assumed that no democratic country will ever attack another democratic society. A democratic 
China would therefore not be a security risk for the Western world. 
 The book by Liu Jianfei, Democracy and China, has the explicit aim of removing the 
“undemocratic” label attached to China (Liu, 2011) in order to pave the way for China’s 
acceptance as a respected member of a world system dominated by the USA. The question is, 
however, if it will be possible for China to follow in the footsteps of this development without 
undertaking a fundamental change of its political system. Two incidents from China’s recent 
history stand in the way of a recognition of China as an authoritarian political system developing 
towards a democratic state: The massacre in Beijing in 1989 following students’ demonstrations 
demanding democracy. The sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to eleven years in prison in 2009 after the 
publication of “Charter 08”, a manifesto demanding a democratization of China’s political system 
and signed by thousands of Chinese citizens. These incidents have formed a perception in the 
West of a Chinese political elite using extremely violent means in their struggle against any 
democratic development challenging the authoritarian rule of the Communist Party of China. The 
political elite seems to be engaged in a life or death struggle with a number of dissidents 
representing the interests of the population in the building of a democratic society following the 
pattern of the western liberal democracy. This rather one-sided black and white picture of 
political developments in China based solidly on the grim shadow of the above mentioned 
incidents seems to block a global recognition of a China developing towards democracy.  
 The aim of the following article is to describe the discussions among Chinese intellectuals 
on different perceptions of China’s political development in the direction of democracy, a 
concept colored by the differences in political-ideological outlook among the debaters. To what 
degree these debates will influence the democratic development of Chinese society, and whether 
or not this development will satisfy western expectations and make it possible in the Western 
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world to accept China as an equal partner in the global society, would be a natural continuation of 
this line of thought, but falls outside the scope of this article.  
 In order to be able to decide whether China’s political system is becoming more 
democratic or not, it will be necessary first to find out what western liberal democracy actually is, 
and if it is possible among western researchers of democracy to find a unitarian definition of this 
democracy. In the book On Democracy, one of the most famous theoreticians on democracy, 
Robert A. Dahl, defines democracy as a political system providing opportunities for:  
 
1. Effective participation 
2. Equality in voting 
3. Gaining enlightened understanding 
4. Exercising final control over the agenda 
5. Inclusion of adults               
(Dahl, 1998: 37 ) 
 
Samuel P. Huntington, on the other hand, chooses a procedural definition of democracy: “The 
central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the 
people they govern” (Huntington, 1991: 6). This definition of democracy was used by Andrew J. 
Nathan (Nathan, 2008) in an investigation of “...what influential actors and intellectuals in China 
think about the country’s future” (Ibid.: 25). He arrives at the conclusion that: “Persons of 
influence in China who call for democracy are not advocating competitive elections for top 
posts” (Ibid., 39).  Therefore: 
 
...the Chinese actors who currently hold influence are not likely intentionally to steer 
their system toward what most in the West call democracy, for the simple reason that 
most of them do not believe in it. If democracy in the liberal, pluralistic sense is 
going to come to China, either the actors will have to change their minds or they will 
have to lose control over the process. (Ibid.: 39) 
 
In this connection it seems obvious to ask first, whether western liberal democracy is the only 
perceivable form of democracy, and second, if it is possible to compress the essence of 
democracy into an operational parameter as “selection of leaders through competitive elections 
by the people they govern” (Huntington, 1991: 6). 
The discourse about democracy among western researchers seems to question this idea of 
democracy as being universal and optimal. Bruce Gilley and Liu Jiafei both describe the market 
as the democratic economic parallel to political democracy. The market, according to them, 
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represents the aspect of economic democracy in western liberal democracy. But contrary to this, 
Robert A. Dahl criticizes the narrowness of liberal democracy in limiting democratic decision-
making to the political sphere of society. In the book, A Preface to Economic Democracy from 
1985, he discusses the question whether the democratic ideal of political equality can be realized 
in a society with widespread economic inequality; Dahl states that economic inequality inevitably 
will lead to political inequality. Unequal access to economic resources means unequal access to 
political resources and this will undermine the political equality of citizens in society. When the 
first modern democracy was established in the USA, this was not a problem because farm land, at 
that time the most important source of economic wealth, was available in virtually unlimited 
quantities. With “…a modicum of guile, fraud, violence and blunder…” (Dahl, 1985: 71), land 
could be robbed from the original inhabitants, the Indians, and any settler would in principle be 
able to increase his economic resources for as long as he wished. The original settler society was 
thus characterized by a high degree of equality among white male settlers in an economic as well 
as political sense. But this historically unique situation disappeared when a new economic order, 
“corporate capitalism”, replaced the original settler economy. In corporate capitalism wealth is 
not readily available for all citizens, and this economy inevitably creates inequality in the 
distribution of property and economic resources and thus also political inequality. A prerequisite 
for a true democracy in corporate capitalism is the extension of democracy to the economic 
sphere, and this means that there must be greater equality in the distribution of society’s 
economic resources and democratic influence on the decisions taken within the private 
companies. According to Dahl, the solution cannot consist in building a “bureaucratic socialism” 
because this type of society also has a tendency to cause so much inequality in access to social 
and economic resources that it brings about “…violations of political equality and hence the 
democratic process.” (Dahl, 1985: 60)What Dahl wants is an extension of the democratic process 
to include businesses. All the arguments justifying political democracy, i.e. leadership of the 
state, can, according to Dahl, just as well be used to argue for democracy in the management of 
individual companies. A state is a political system built around power relations between 
government and the governed (the citizens). Likewise, a company may be described as a political 
system where power relations between government (business administration) and the governed 
(company employees) exist. The political decisions taken by the management of a company are 
essential to and binding for the employees of the company, in the same sense as political 
decisions are binding for all individual citizens of the state. If the democratic process is a 
fundamental value to society, the members of any community, and this includes companies, 
should have the right to self-determination, i.e. the right to influence decisions that have an effect 
on their lives, through a democratic process. 
Peer Møller Christensen  JCIR: VOL. 2, No. 1 (2014) 
99 
 
Since the foundation of the United States of America, there has, according to Dahl, been 
two opposing answers to the question of what should be considered most important, private 
property or democracy, because these two are in obvious contradiction to one another. 
Proponents of the primacy of property believed that concern for political equality had to give way 
to the interests of private property. Supporters of democracy insisted that a person’s right to self-
determination was more basic than ownership. The protection of private property was introduced 
in the U.S. Constitution alongside a number of other fundamental rights. This was, according to 
Dahl, understandable in the original agricultural settler society, where the private property of 
each individual was closely connected to the ability to sustain life. But after the transition to 
corporate capitalism, the fundamental right to private property from the agricultural society was 
continued as the ideological justification of private ownership of capital. According to Dahl, one 
cannot, however, simply transfer the natural moral right to own, “... the shirt you wear on the 
body and the cash you have in your purse” (Dahl, 1985: 75) for the right to acquire shares in a 
company and thus achieve control of economic decisions. 
Dahl argues that the democratic right to self-determination takes precedence over private 
property, and it must therefore be possible for members of a community and that community’s 
political representatives to decide democratically how companies are to be owned and controlled 
to ensure values as “democracy, fairness, efficiency, the cultivation of desirable human qualities 
and an entitlement to such minimal personal resources as may be necessary to a good life” (Dahl, 
1985: 83). 
Just three years after the publication of Dahl’s book, the Berlin Wall fell, and the world 
had changed. The Cold War world system was replaced by a new world system with only one 
superpower. Neoliberalism captured the global economic and political discourse and the image of 
the ideal democratic capitalist society was soon supplemented by theories of a new crisis-free 
capitalism. At the same time, the concept of socialism became synonymous with political 
dictatorship. Socialist ideas such as Dahl’s notions of economic democracy were pushed into the 
darkness, and when political scientists since then have referred to his theories of democracy, they 
have overlooked the book from 1985. In China, however, this book and the viewpoints presented 
in it form important parts of the discussions on democracy. 
When analyzing political developments in China, western researchers often use a 
distinction between reformers and conservatives as an analytical tool. This distinction is shaped 
by the political spectrum as manifested in the US political system, consisting of conservatives 
and liberals, but with no room left for socialist ideology of any kind. Reformers are intellectuals 
and politicians interested in reforming the economic and political system in China, while 
conservatives are defending the existing economic and political system. Sometimes this approach 
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results in the rather awkward pooling together of the entire Chinese left-wing with 
neoconservatives, forming a united conservative front against the reformists. In my opinion it is 
much more advisable to use the European political spectrum, reaching from left to right, from 
communism/socialism to the left and conservatism/fascism to the right. This is also the way most 
Chinese intellectuals perceive political differences of opinion, and the European concepts are 
broadly used in the identification and self-identification in the political discourse in China.  
In China’s academic circles, a political spectrum of political-ideological perceptions has 
developed since the middle part of the 1990s. The core of academic ideological discussions in the 
latter part of the last century was most outspokenly expressed in the debates between the 
Neoliberals and the New Left. Apart from these two major groups a number of perceptions 
distinctively different from these emerged, and political discussions in Chinese academic circles 
in the last decade have circulated around a spectrum of political-ideological perceptions/groups, 
presented along ideological lines in accordance with the political spectrum of Western European 
design from right to left: Neoconservatives, Neoliberals, Social Liberals, Social Democrats, The 
New Left, The Old Left. Outside of this European-style political spectrum one can find “Political 
Confucianism”. The number among these public intellectuals who have spent years studying in 
the West is impressive, and explains the fact that almost all of them are very familiar with 
western political ideas and discussions. 
These different groups of public intellectuals differ fundamentally in their views on the 
development of China and the economic, political and social aspects of this development. Not 
surprisingly, their perceptions of the present Chinese political system and interpretation of the 
necessity or possibility of democratization of this system are fundamentally different.  
Among the neoconservatives, a certain skepticism about forced political reforms exists 
because it is feared that a hasty democratization would lead to a new weakening of state power. 
Many neoconservatives also believe that China is not yet ready for democracy. 
Liberalists, Neoliberals, Social Liberals and Social Democrats, all advocate the establishment of a 
constitutional democracy. The different shades of liberalists furthermore oppose direct 
democracy, believing that it could lead to destabilizing mass demonstrations and unrest. 
Intellectuals from The New Left emphasize the connection between political and economic 
democracy, and laud some of the experiences with political institutions from the Maoist past, the 
so-called “mass democracy” of the Cultural Revolution. The old left may be divided into two 
groups: Maoists and Orthodox Marxists. The Maoists oppose a bourgeois multi-party system and, 
like the New Left, support “mass democracy.” Orthodox Marxists advocate a combination of 
economic and political democracy, and respect for the principles of the Paris Commune. Political 
Confucianism, as presented by Jiang Qing in the Appendix 2: Jiang Qing’s Political 
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Confucianism, in China’s New Confucianism by Daniel A. Bell, (Bell, 2008) advocates a 
tricameral system with an important element of meritocracy and conservatism. The ideas of Jiang 
Qing seems quite far removed from democracy. 
Debates between public intellectuals representing these different political-ideological 
groups are easily followed in the Chinese media and Chinese blogs and websites on the internet. 
It is, however, frustrating that it is impossible to follow how this discussion is reflected in debates 
inside the Chinese Communist Party. This is a consequence of the principle of democratic 
centralism. According to this principle, which is the ruling principle of party conduct, discussions 
inside the Party are free and allow for differences of opinion among participants, but once a 
consensus has been arrived at, only this consensus is presented to the public, while disagreements 
are kept secret and only accessed by the public as rumors and speculations. Therefore, it is close 
to impossible to analyze discussions about political reforms and democratization in China inside 
the Party. It is only possible to analyze discussions among public intellectuals, and make the 
assumption that this discussion is actually reflected into and, at the same time, a reflection of 
disagreements inside the Party.  
 
Discussions on Democracy Leading up to the 17th Party Congress 
If we turn our attention towards the 17th Party Congress convened in November 2007, we will 
notice a heated debate on the question of China’s democratization performed by representatives 
of these different groups in the time leading up to the congress. 
On March 4, 2006, a secret conference was held in the mountain village Xinglin west of 
Beijing. The conference was organized by the China Society of Economic Reform (CSER), a 
think tank  under the State Council, with the purpose of discussing the topic: “China’s macro 
economy and progress of reforms”, but the  discussions also touched upon the perspectives for 
political reform in China. 
40 high-level experts - economists, lawyers and government advisers attended the 
conference, which was chaired by the President of CSER, Gao Shangquan. Also present at the 
conference were: Zhang Weiying Professor of Economics, Beijing University, He Weifang, 
Professor of Law at Beijing University, Li Shuguang, Vice Dean of China Politics and Law 
University, Beijing, Xie Ping, official of the central banking system, Zhang Chunlin, 
restructuring expert at the World Bank, and former member of China’s State Economic and Trade 
Commission, Zhang Shuguang, Beijing Economic Research Institute. In China, all of these 
intellectuals are known to be Neoliberals or Liberals. 
The conference was held in secret, but one participant, Li Yang, wrote down 
comprehensive notes, which were later published. At the conference, participants according to Li 
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Yang’s record, suggested that China should emulate Taiwan’s political system, that the 
Communist Party of China should be divided into two factions, the military should be under state 
command; furthermore, neo-liberal participants at the conference allegedly complained that the 
ideology limited reformists, so they often had to pretend they were moving to the left, when they, 
in fact, were moving towards the right. At the meeting, it was also stated that the phase of 
“economic reform” was over, and that China should now move towards “political reform”. When 
news about the conference was published, a number of critical comments emerged on the 
internet, accusing the participants of the conference of planning to undermine China’s socialist 
system.  
 In October 2006, Yu Keping published an article, “Democracy is a Good Thing” (Minzhu 
shi ge hao dongxi) which attracted broad attention and also played a significant role in the 
discussions about democratization up to the 17th Party Congress. In the article, Yu Keping 
stressed the need for a democratization of the political system in China, but at the same time 
emphasized that the process should be gradual and based upon Chinese historical conditions. One 
concept coined in this article, “incremental democracy”, has become central in the following 
discussions about democracy in China. The development of a democratic system must, according 
to Yu Keping, be gradual or incremental like the gradual implementation of the Chinese 
economic reforms, where the “shock”- strategy, recommended by some western economists, was 
avoided. In the same way, a “shock”-like reform of the political system would not be advisable, 
as it would challenge China’s social stability. 
  
During 2007 in the months leading up to the 17th Party Congress, the journal, Study Times 
(Xuexi Shibao), published by the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China in Beijing, brought a number of articles focusing on the gradual nature of 
democratization and stressing the link between market economy and political democracy (Xuexi 
Shibao (Study Times), 2007). The development of socialism with Chinese characteristics means, 
according to the articles, the development of an economic market and political democratization. 
These two goals and trends are logic and closely linked together. The fundamental relations of a 
market economy, i.e. contractual relations, are based on the freedom of choice of the market 
agents. In this sense the market economy realizes a form of economic democracy, and this 
economic democracy will inevitably require a corresponding political democracy. Socialist 
market economy actually constitutes the basis for the development of a socialist democracy. A 
market economy characterized by freedom, equality and competition may be regarded as a 
training ground, where people can learn about democracy and have the opportunity to develop 
democratic virtues and abilities. In order to create a socialist democracy, which is a more 
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comprehensive and true democracy than the capitalist democracy, it is, however, necessary to 
ensure that the socialist market economy becomes even more free, more just and more 
competitive than the capitalist market economy. The political system must be reformed gradually 
in the same way as the economy was developed, i.e. the democracy already established at village 
level should be strengthened within the Communist Party, and then gradually extended: from the 
periphery to the center, from the grassroots to the upper levels,  from individual areas to the 
whole. 
 This view of democracy was, however, soon after countered both from the Right and from 
the Left in China. The Liberalist, Liu Junning (Liu, 2007) criticized the idea that democratization 
of China should be based on the development of internal democracy in the Communist Party. 
This would only lead the discussion on democratization astray. In his opinion, the effort should 
be directed towards replacing democratic centralism with a constitutional democracy where the 
separation of powers through the constitution is used to create a system of mutual control 
between the three instances of power. This kind of democracy should be the ultimate goal of 
political reform in China. Zhu Xiaopeng from the New Left attacked the very idea that market 
economy leads to democracy (Zhu, 2007). He stated that collective production is the true creator 
of the conditions for political democracy. Democratic leadership in accordance with the principle 
of one man one vote is a fundamental principle of modern cooperatives’ guarantees that a vital 
economic democracy will exist within the company, and that this kind of company democracy 
can be extended to society as a whole. In modern western countries, factories and businesses are, 
in his opinion, totally lacking a political democratic process. 
 The most controversial proposal in the democracy debate leading up to the party congress, 
however, came from Professor Xie Tao. Xie Tao, who has been a member of the Chinese 
Communist Party since 1946, published an article called “Only democratic socialism can save 
China” (Xie, 2007) in the liberal journal, Yuan Huang Chunqiu. In this article, Xie Tao refers to 
the European social democracy as the only way forward for China, i.e. the establishment of a 
mixed economy with elements of both capitalism and socialism combined with a constitutional 
democracy. Xie Tao based his argument for the relevance of social democracy to China on an 
analysis of international developments since the Second World War. In the postwar period the 
world was characterized by peaceful rivalry between three types of society: the capitalist system 
represented by the United States, the communist system represented by the USSR and the 
socialist system represented by Sweden among other nations. Social democracy prevailed and 
thus changed both capitalism and communism. The social democratic parties in Europe have 
downgraded the criticism of capitalism and the bourgeoisie and created a peaceful transition to 
socialism. Thus, the Social Democrats not only revitalized socialism but also capitalism. A class 
Peer Møller Christensen  JCIR: VOL. 2, No. 1 (2014) 
104 
 
compromise between the bourgeoisie and the working class has enabled the creation of welfare 
capitalism. According to Xie Tao, the Soviet Union’s collapse was due to the fact that the Soviet 
leadership did not follow this trend, but held on to the communist system, and if China wants to 
avoid a similar collapse, it is necessary to establish a democratic socialist system like the western 
system. The core of western democratic socialism, according to Xie Tao, is democracy, but it is 
also important that this system opens the possibility of social differences. Differences in the 
distribution of production function as an economic impetus in society. If social differences (Xie 
Tao specifically mentions the Gini coefficient as a measure of these social differences) are too 
small, society will lack dynamism, but if they are too large they could create social unrest. 
 Xie Tao’s article was soon attacked by representatives from both the Old and the New 
Left, but also from a liberalist approach. In the article, “Democratic socialism, from a 
constitutional democratic point of view”, (Xu, 2007) the liberalist, Xu Youyu, praises Xie Tao for 
advocating the introduction of a constitutional democracy, but in Xu Youyu’s opinion, social 
democracy has not played any significant role in the development of constitutional democracy. 
Constitutional democracy on the contrary was a prerequisite for the emergence of social 
democracy, and the credit for this type of democracy must, in his opinion, be given to liberalism, 
which from the outset clearly has strengthened individual freedom and emphasized the need to 
control the state and make representatives accountable for their actions. The self-declared social 
democrat, Chen Ziming, expresses his conviction that there will be possibilities for future 
cooperation between the Chinese social democracy and the democratic-minded among the 
liberalists in an effort to establish a constitutional democracy in China (Chen, 2007). Zhang 
Qinde from the Old Left criticizes Xie Tao’s “Democratic Socialism” (Zhang, 2007), which, in 
his view, would be tantamount to a complete restoration of capitalism with a “mixed economy” 
where private property is the basic form of ownership. Wang Shaoguang from the New Left 
(Wang, 2007) criticized Xie Tao for not distinguishing between “democratic socialism” and 
“social democracy”. He agrees that socialism should be democratic and not autocratic, and 
democratic socialism is of course thus worth striving for, but Wang Shaoguang has a completely 
different understanding of democratic socialism. Xie Tao perceives social democracy as a 
capitalist society where raw capitalism is adjusted by social policy. For Wang Shaoguang, 
democratic socialism is primarily socialism, which requires common property, and not just 
redistribution of production. Social democracy   guarantees the basic capitalist nature of society. 
A certain element of welfare policy is implemented, and in this way class differences are reduced 
but not eliminated, and the capitalist character of society based on exploitation of the workers 
will continue to exist. In Wang Shaoguang’s view, Xie Tao does not understand the historical 
background of the emergence of social democracy in Northern Europe and liberal capitalism in 
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the United States, namely the existence of a rival communist system which made it impossible to 
maintain hard-nosed capitalism with the social consequences that this would lead to. 
 Mingpao Monthly’s October issue brought an article reporting from a discussion meeting 
held in Hong Kong about the concept of democracy where the speakers were Gan Yang and 
Zhang Qinde both from The New Left and Xie Tao (Mingpao Monthly, 2007). Gan Yang found it 
difficult to understand Xie Tao, whose main views he summarizes as follows: Marxist orthodoxy 
is democratic socialism. After the end of the Cold War, Marxist orthodoxy - namely democratic 
socialism - was victorious all over the globe. Not only the whole of Europe became democratic 
socialist, but also the United States. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet 
Union as such fell apart because they did not follow the “road of democratic socialism.” The 
Chinese Communist Party did not suffer the same fate as the Soviet and Eastern European 
countries, because Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were in fact socialist reforms. It is, in Gan Yang’s 
view (Mingpao Monthly, 2007), completely wrong to state that the Soviet Union fell because its 
leaders did not choose social democracy, since everyone knows that the slogan of Gorbachev’s 
reforms were “democratic socialism” (social democracy), and at the same time Gan Yang 
emphasizes that Gorbachev’s theory of “democratic socialism” was far more systematic and 
refined than Xie Tao’s. The problem was that not even Gorbachev’s “democratic socialism” 
could save the Soviet Union. To claim that Marxism is equal to Swedish social democracy, and 
that the U.S. political system is also democratic socialism, is, according to Gan Yang, something 
that no one can take seriously. 
 Zhang Qinde emphasizes that the core of the political reform should be a popular 
democracy, while elite democracy will destroy the grass-roots democracy. For democracy outside 
the party, Zhang Qinde emphasizes that the right to strike and the right of individuals to consult 
with the authorities should be reintroduced into the Constitution. As part of the development of 
the intra-party democracy, Zhang Qinde also suggests that the report for the 17th Party Congress 
should be sent out for discussion and commenting by all party members, and that all party 
members should  report on their own and their family members’ access to private companies and 
other sources of income.  
 Liu Yongji (Liu, 2007), who must also be counted as a member of the New Left, agrees 
with Zhang Qinde’s critique of western “elite democracy” where the people elect representatives 
from the elite, and competition between the candidates largely has the form of a show in which 
participation of the people is limited to playing the role of spectators. In western democracies, the 
unequal distribution of resources also, in his opinion, necessarily implies that only the rich have 
the resources to stand as candidates, and also have the best opportunities to influence elections 
with their economic resources. According to Liu Yongji, American political science studies have 
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revealed that only between 3 and 10% of the voters have a real ideological or political belief, and  
the elective behavior of the rest is mainly affected by the sudden emergence of information and 
political individual cases. In a western market economy system, the economic power indirectly 
determines the outcome of elections through the mass media. In the United States there is a clear 
correlation between political candidates’ financial resources and election results, and this system 
is not, according to Liu Yongji, a system which should be emulated in China. 
 Du Ping (Du, 2007), who also belongs to the New Left, criticizes the belief that 
globalization and foreign investment in China will lead to the democratization of the country. 
Foreign investors have no interest in the democratization of China. In a non-democratic China, 
the government will interfere in conflicts between the foreign company and its Chinese 
employees could to protect foreign capital, by deploying police or use other means of power. This 
means that foreign companies do not have to make compromises with their employees about 
wages and working conditions, and profit on their commitments to China will not be threatened 
by labor disputes. The problem is not, according to Du Ping, that China lacks capital; China lacks 
a democratic system that can act as a counterweight to the power of capital. “Democracy is not 
capital twin brother,” writes You Ping, and, in his opinion, you cannot assume that capitalism 
will lead to political civilization and social progress. 
 The Chinese discussions up to the 17th Party Congress of democratization of the Chinese 
political system were not a discussion for or against the introduction of democracy. All the 
participating political groupings, from left to right, are supporters of democracy, but they do not 
agree on the democratic model or how democracy should be implemented. 
 
Storm the Fortress 
Only a few months after the 17th Party congress, a comprehensive 30-year plan for gradual 
implementation of political reforms in China leading towards realization of a modern Chinese 
socialist democracy was published. 
The plan was presented in a 366-page report: Storm the Fortress. A Research report on 
Reform of China’s Political System after the 17 Party Congress (Zhou, Wang and Wang (eds.), 
2008), published in January 2008. The report was prepared by a group of researchers affiliated 
with the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. It 
was actually already finished in October (2007) - immediately after the convening of the 17th 
Party Congress - but not publicly accessible on the Chinese book market until January 2008 -  at 
first only within Communist Party communication channels, but later for sale in ordinary 
bookstores, and significant sections of the report were posted on the Communist Party’s official 
website. The fact that the researchers behind the report are attached to the Communist Party 
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Central Party School may be seen as an indication that the plan was approved by the central 
leadership of the Communist Party, at least as a basis for discussion. One of the three editors of 
the report, Zhou Tianyong, stresses, in the first chapter of the report, that democratization of the 
political system should aim at limiting the political power of the Communist Party as a 
prerequisite for ensuring future political stability in China. Democratization should, according to 
the report, be phased in three stages, which together would extend more than 60 years. In the first 
phase, lasting from 1979 to 2001, the focus was primarily on economic reforms. In the second 
phase, which would cover the period from 2002 to 2020, China should establish a modern 
democratic political system and a comprehensive legal system. In the third phase, which is 
supposed to last from 2021 to 2040, the democratic and legal system will undergo further 
development. In Chapter 3 of the report, it is discussed how an effective system of balance and 
mutual control between power bodies of the political system may be established. As part of such 
a balance of power, it is proposed that the Chinese parliament, the National People’s Congress, 
should have direct authority to draft the state budget and control government spending. Chapter 6 
deals with the question of how the building of a harmonious society can benefit from popular and 
religious organizations and civil society development in general. The authors of the report also 
underline that there should be a law protecting journalists and putting an end to unconstitutional 
and unlawful interference in the media, in this way promoting real freedom of expression. 
It is not the first time one of the leading political centers in China has presented plans on 
political reforms in the direction of democratization of the Chinese political system. In October 
2005, the Information Office of the State Council (the Chinese government) published a White 
Paper called Building a Political Democracy in China (Zhongguo de minzhu zhengzhi jianshe, 
2005). It is not surprising that the new plan originates from the Central Party School. As 
mentioned above, at the run-up to the Chinese Communist Party’s 17th Congress, there was a 
lively debate in Chinese media on the democratization of Chinese society, and the initiative for 
this debate came from the magazine Xuexi Shibao (Study Journal) published by the Central Party 
School. 
One might have expected that the 30-year plan would lead to a resumption of the debate 
on democratization in China, but in March 2008 riots broke out in Tibet and in May the Sichuan 
Province was hit by a massive earthquake. Later that same year, the Beijing Olympics attracted 
all media attention, so the democracy debate did not arise again until fall 2008, first with the 
publication of a book on democracy, “Four Lectures on Democracy”, by New Leftist Wang 
Shaoguang, and then in December that same year with a dramatic initiative of the liberalist wing 
of the political spectrum, in form of the so-called “Charter 08”, demanding democratic change in 
China.  
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Wang Shaoguang’s “Four Lectures on Democracy” (Wang, 2008) is a comprehensive 
presentation of the history of democracy and a number of considerations about the democratic 
future of China. The contents of the book may be summarized in the following 4 points: First, 
Wang Shaoguang concludes from his analysis of the history of democracy that the bourgeois elite 
throughout history has seen democracy in its true essence as a “bad thing”. “Good democracy” in 
a bourgeois sense is democracy where the people choose their masters. Second, he questions the 
perception prevalent in both China and the world in general of US democracy as the paragon of 
democracy. Actually, the democratic system in several European countries is much more 
democratic than US democracy. Third, he argues that because “choosing one’s master” is not real 
democracy, representative democracy will not necessarily improve the living conditions of the 
broad population. Cross-national and historical comparative studies have shown that there is no 
necessary relationship between actually-existing democratic systems and economic growth, 
social justice, or human welfare. Fourth, in political systems where the population “chooses its 
masters” the vast majority of the population is reduced to participators in regular elections which 
are actually mainly shows, where people with resources are able to use these resources to gain 
political influence. 
On December 10, 2008, on the 60th anniversary of the UN Declaration on Human Rights, 
the dissidents, Liu Xiaobo and Xu Wenli, published a manifesto called “Charter 08”. The name 
was obviously chosen to invoke memories of “Charter 77”, in which a number of intellectuals in 
1977 in the Czechoslovakia of that time demanded human rights and democracy in the Czech 
communist one-party state. The Chinese “Charter 08” was published on the internet and signed 
by 300 prominent Chinese, and in a short time, the number of signatures rose to more than 7000. 
“Charter 08” espouses a number of basic principles: freedom, human rights, equality, 
republicanism, democracy and constitutional government. Practical changes demanded by the 
manifesto included: a new constitution, separation of powers, democratic legislation, independent 
judiciary, public control of public servants, guarantee of human rights, democratic elections, 
equal rights for urban and rural areas, the right to form associations, freedom of assembly, 
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, civic education, protection of private property, 
reform of the financial system and the tax system, social security, environmental protection, a 
federal republic, redress to all victims of political persecution. These requirements provoked the 
Chinese authorities so severely that several of the initiators were picked up for questioning by the 
police, and the most prominent of its authors, Liu Xiaobo, was arrested and later sentenced to 11 
years in prison. 
The manifesto was supported by a number of liberalist intellectuals, e.g. Xu Youyu, but 
none of these received any form of punishment comparable to the sentencing of Liu Xiaobo. 
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Many of the demands in the manifesto coincide with the objectives outlined in Storm The 
Fortress from the Communist Party’s Central Party School in Beijing. It is therefore still 
somewhat of a mystery why exactly Liu Xiaobo was to be punished so severely. A few years 
later, Liu Xiaobo, to the great annoyance of the Chinese leadership, received the Nobel Peace 
Prize.  
 
Discussions Leading up to the 18th Party Congress 
During the year leading up to the 18th Party Congress, 2012, the political scene in China became 
totally dominated by the Bo Xilai scandal. Bo Xilai, the party secretary of Chongqing, was 
arrested and accused of a number of crimes. I am not going to describe this affair in details here. 
However, the Bo Xilai affair had a direct impact on the landscape of political discussions in 
China. Intellectuals from the New Left were accused of having close relations to Bo Xilai and 
even for having received financial support for their activities in the form of black money. As a 
consequence the most important website of the New Left, “Wuyouxiang” (Utopia) alongside 
many other minor websites and blogs were closed and investigated by the authorities. Of course 
this was a major setback for the left wing in Chinese politics so close to the 18th Party Congress, 
which was in fact postponed for a few weeks because of the Bo Xilai incident. The crackdown on 
the left wing, however, did not prevent two of its most prominent members, Wang Shaoguang 
and Han Yuhai, from publishing rather radical articles about China’s democratic development. 
In the article “Reflections on Democratic Systems” (Wang, 2012) Wang Shaoguang 
discusses alternatives to a representative democracy based on general elections which he 
describes as democracy where “the people chooses its masters”.  In order to establish a system 
where “the people are in charge to make decisions” he has four suggestions, which all aim at 
“expanding the political participation of the broad masses of the people”. First, he proposes to 
replace elections with a lottery system, thereby strengthening public participation. This should 
eliminate the problems of differences in resources leading to differences in political influence. 
The second proposal is to strengthen consultations, and increasing the depth of political 
participation by deliberative or consultative democracy. According to Wang Shaoguang 
consultations and lotteries can be merged together. Wang Shaoguang’s third proposal is to 
increase public participation through information technology, i.e. “electronic democracy” and 
public dissemination of information through electronic means. Fourth, in full accordance with the 
ideas by Robert A. Dahl presented above, Wang Shaoguang proposes to extend democracy 
“beyond the realm of politics into more areas of social life, particularly the economic sphere.” 
(Wang, 2012) 
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In the article “Constitutional Rule and the Proletarian State” (Han, 2012), Han Yuhai presents his 
ideas about what he calls “proletarian constitutionalism”. Whereas he does not consider the 
bourgeois elite in China as capable of creating a constitutional democracy, he perceives the 
creation of a proletarian constitutionalism as a precondition for establishing a true democracy. 
According to Han Yuhai, China’s capitalist class can be divided into two fractions: on one hand 
the large bureaucratic and large comprador capitalist class intimately related to the regime, on the 
other, the private capitalist class engaged in private business. These two fractions of the capitalist 
class will never be able to establish the political unity necessary for establishing a bourgeois 
constitutional democracy, which, he fears, would degenerate into a military dictatorship. The 
proletariat, on the other hand, needs a constitutional rule, and Han Yuhai argues for this as 
follows: 
 
The really-existing proletarian states have for the most part been established by a 
professional revolutionary organization that represents a relatively weak proletariat, 
leading the peasantry and other laboring masses (and taking them as their main force) 
in a revolution. This model of revolution is determined by the fact that these countries 
have not industrialized, and therefore the proletariat is relatively weak. 
Political power in proletarian states is monopolized by the organization of 
professional revolutionaries, in what can be called a tyrannical proletarian role. ....as 
time passes, due to the lack of effective supervision by the proletariat and laborers, 
most of the professional revolutionaries are unavoidably corrupted by bourgeois 
rights, and end up transforming into a bureaucratic special interest group that rides on 
the backs of the masses. Further, the proletarian state changes into a hideous 
totalitarian state controlled by the new bourgeoisie. 
.... the political power of the proletariat class must always by supervised and 
controlled by the class itself, thereby ensuring that its operation will be in the 
common interest of the class. Furthermore, the political power of the state must be 
enjoyed by the entire class, and not monopolized in a particular fraction. In other 
words, the proletariat must have its own ‘constitutionalism!’ 
.... 
The policy  of ‘constitutionalism’ of course is in the service of the long-term and 
stable political power of the proletariat, but it also takes as its aims continual 
proletarian revolution, the gradual dissolution of the state, and the eradication of 
class. These struggles can only continue under the framework of ‘constitutionalism’. 
(Ibid.) 
 
     
Political Reforms and Democratic Perspectives after the 18th Party Congress 
After the conclusion of the 18th Party Congress it has been discussed whether the new leadership 
of the Communist Party of China would implement reforms, either of an economic or a political 
character. It seems that the new leaders are keen on further reforming the economy, while 
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political reforms may be limited to crackdowns on corruption. The much published “China 
Dream” seems not to include serious political reforms, while “Lionomics”1 seems to be the new 
catchword in China. 
Maybe as a reaction to this perspective, a group of more than 70 Chinese intellectuals 
signed an open letter circulated on the internet by the end of 2012, calling for political reforms 
(chinaworker.info, 2013). 
The open letter, “Proposal for a Consensus on Reform” warns of the dangers of not 
implementing political reforms. “If reforms of the system urgently needed by Chinese society 
keep being frustrated and stagnate,” it states, “then official corruption and dissatisfaction in 
society will boil up to a crisis point and China will once again miss the opportunity for peaceful 
reform, and slip into the turbulence and chaos of violent revolution.” The open letter does not 
demand the end of one-party rule, but instead advocates top-down and gradual “reform”, 
including calls for a free press and independent judiciary, very much in accordance with the 
perspectives outlined in 2008 by Storm the Fortress. 
The demands from this open letter were echoed in the liberal magazine, Yanhuang 
Chunqiu, which in an editorial called for the protection of China’s constitution, and consequently 
was temporarily closed down on January 4 by propaganda officials in Beijing. 
Soon after this event, the Guangdong based liberal newspaper Southern Weekly had its 
editorial rewritten by provincial propaganda boss Tuo Zhen, because it called for the realization 
of the “dream of constitutionalism in China”. This led to strikes among the paper’s journalists 
and massive public demonstrations on this crackdown by the authorities on freedom of the press.  
It thus seems difficult to determine in what direction the Chinese leadership wants the 
political system in China to develop. Among public intellectuals and media workers the debate 
on the political future of China is heated, and lately some surveys on the public opinion on 
democracy give us some indications of what the broad population wants of the development. 
 
What Kind of Democracy Do the Chinese Want? 
At the time of the CCP’s 18th Congress in November the results of a survey were published in 
the Global Times, a regime mouthpiece, showing that 81 % of respondents supported political 
reform. 
At the beginning of May 2013, the results of a survey conducted by the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences were published in a report called “What kind of Democracy Do Chinese 
Want” (Zhang, 2013c). 
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The survey was undertaken by social scientist Zhang Mingshu and was a follow-up in a 
similar survey also undertaken by Zhang Mingshu in 1988 and resulting in the report “The 
Political Chinese” (Zhongguo Zhengzhiren) published in 1994. 
The survey in 2012 was conducted among 1,750 adults in 4 towns (no interviews were 
undertaken in rural areas). The respondents were asked a number of questions about their 
political attitudes. Concerning the general political attitudes of the respondents the conclusion 
made by the report is: 38.1 % of the respondents are leaning to the left and critical of overall 
individualism. 8 % are leaning to the right, supporting more individual freedoms and a smaller 
government, and were more critical towards the Communist Party’s legacy. The rest could be 
called centrists, i.e. neither left nor right. For 15.3 % of those surveyed, the idea of democracy 
meant regular elections and selecting national leaders through multiparty competition. About 67 
% said they had a positive attitude towards participating in politics. People beyond their 40s and 
50s tended to lean more to the left than younger people, who tended to be at the center and the 
right. More educated people also tended to be more at the center and the right. It thus seems from 
the report that only a small minority, 15.3 % of the respondents, are in favor of liberal democracy 
(Zhang, 2013b). 
Actually, this result stands in sharp contrast to a survey performed by PewResearch, 
where the respondents among other questions also were asked about their attitude towards 
American democracy (PewResearch, 2012). Between March 18 and April 15, 2012, PewResearch 
interviewed 3,177 Chinese respondents. Roughly half (52%) said they like American ideas about 
democracy; just 29% said they dislike these ideas. About seven-in-ten Chinese in the higher-
income category have a positive opinion about American democratic ideals. 
 




Source: (PewResearch Global Attitudes Project, 2012: 4) 
 
The outspoken difference between the results of these two surveys may be interpreted and 
explained in many different ways, something I am not going to do in this article. However, the 
fact that it is not possible to get a clear picture of attitudes to democracy in the Chinese 
population when comparing the results of these two surveys is disappointing.  
 
Conclusion 
The intellectual debates in China on the democratic development of China’s political system and 
the plans for political reforms drafted by Chinese think-tanks, like the Central Party School, seem 
to outline a number of differences in the perceptions of what direction this development should 
follow. All participants seem to agree that it is necessary to change the political system in a more 
democratic direction. There is also a general agreement that constitutionalism in some form ought 
to be the basis of this democratization, i.e. the political and social rights included in the Chinese 
constitution should be fully respected and form the basis of a future democratic China. On the 
other hand the debates also show that the interpretation of the concept constitutionalism differs 
among the politico-ideological groups. The liberal side of the spectrum seems to be in favor of a 
liberal democracy in the form of a constitutional democracy like the American political system, 
and thus not like the different European varieties of liberal democracy, whose institutional 
arrangements differ distinctively from the American model. Intellectuals on the left side of the 
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specter emphasize that constitutionalism may only be realized as what is called a “proletarian 
constitutionalism”, with characteristics widely different from American constitutionalism. 
Furthermore they outline a variety of possible alternative institutional forms in the future Chinese 
democracy, i.e. economic democracy, lottery instead of elections, development of deliberative 
and consultative forms of democratic participation, etc.  
Although Chinese intellectuals form a minority in society, these intellectual debates are 
sure to have influence on both public opinion and opinions and attitudes among political decision 
makers inside the Chinese Communist Party. Further investigations will have to establish to what 
degree the perceptions of China’s political future and democratization are mirrored in the 
political attitudes among the Chinese in general, and how they are mirrored inside the confines of 
political decision making in the Chinese Communist Party. Only then will it be possible to 
answer the questions: “What kind of democracy do the Chinese want?” and “What kind of 
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